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1 
UNCERTAINTY ABOUT REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST AND 
PRIVITY IN AIA TRIALS 
EVAN DAY, KEVIN PATARIU & BING AI 
Since the 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) created ad-
ministrative trial proceedings (“AIA trials”) at the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board (PTAB) of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the PTAB has been 
one of the busiest patent litigation venues in the U.S. with nearly eight thou-
sand petitions for AIA trials filed so far.1 Congress imposes strict limits on 
the use of AIA trials to further the goal of providing a “cost effective alter-
native to formal litigation”2 while reducing “the ability to use post-grant pro-
cedures for abusive serial challenges to patents.”3 To achieve such goals, the 
AIA limits certain actions that can be taken by a petitioner, a real party in 
interest (RPI) or party in privity with the petitioner. Under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 315(b), a party sued for patent infringement may not file a petition for IPR 
of a patent more than one year after service of the complaint, and this time 
bar also applies to an RPI or party in privity with the petitioner.4 In addition, 
the AIA’s estoppel provisions limit the ability of the petitioner, an RPI or 
privy of the petitioner, to raise certain invalidity issues in another AIA trial 
before the PTAB or a proceeding before a district court and the International 
Trade Commission (ITC).5 Notably, AIA trials may impact district court pa-
tent litigation through stays of litigation, dismissal of asserted claims found 
 
 Perkins Coie LLP, 11988 El Camino Real, Suite 350, San Diego, CA 92130.  The authors wish to thank: 
the CKJIP staff, for editing and feedback on this article; Meghan Bright, for cite-checking assistance; the 
PTAB Bar Association, in particular Christopher Geyer, Joshua Goldberg, and Dan Gjorgiev, for editing 
and feedback on drafts of this article; and Amanda Tessar and Elizabeth Banzhoff for their previous 
research on this topic which was invaluable during the writing of this article. 
 1.  The Patent Office has been receiving between one hundred and two hundred new petitions for 
AIA trials each month in recent years. As of December 31, 2017, a total of 7,930 petitions were filed. See 
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRIAL STATISTICS: IPR, PGR, CBM, 3 (2017), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Trial_Statistics_2017-12-31.pdf. 
 2.  157 CONG. REC. S951 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (Statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 3.  157 CONG. REC. S952 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (Statement of Sen. Grassley). 
 4.  35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012). 
 5.  35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (petitioner, RPI, or privy estopped from asserting before Patent Office, in 
civil action, or ITC proceeding invalidity grounds that were raised or reasonably could have been raised 
during IPR resulting in final written decision) and 325(e) (same for post-grant review). The AIA also 
provides a more limited estoppel against a Covered Business Method petitioner in district court and ITC 
proceedings. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284. §§ 
18(a)(1)(D),18(a)(1)(A). 
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unpatentable by the PTAB, estoppel against defendants raising certain inva-
lidity grounds after PTAB final written decisions, and more.6 Accordingly, 
properly identifying an RPI or privy of the petitioner is important to parties 
on both sides of a proceeding before the PTAB, a district court or the ITC. 
Uncertainty over the meaning and scope of the “real party in interest” 
or “party in privity” has led to frequent disputes, particularly where the party 
filing an IPR has some relationship to a party sued in a related lawsuit.7 
While the law regarding this issue has so far developed, in the main, through 
non-precedential decisions by individual PTAB panels, the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit recently decided en banc that it had jurisdiction to 
review the issue.8 As a result, patent practitioners should expect more clarity, 
or at least more binding precedent, as to when a defendant in an infringement 
lawsuit is an RPI or in privity with the petitioner in an AIA trial.9 
The AIA requires a petition for an AIA trial to identify “all real parties 
in interest”10 and to certify that the petitioner is not barred or estopped from 
filing the petition due to any RPI or privity relationship.11 Such requirements 
assist the PTAB in identifying conflicts and ensures proper application of 
estoppel provisions precluding an RPI or privy from making invalidity argu-
ments to the PTAB.12 The PTAB has said, in a precedential decision, that the 
statutory requirement to name real parties in interest is not jurisdictional, 
and, therefore, the PTAB has discretion to allow parties to correct defects in 
the identification of RPIs without changing the filing date.13 However, if the 
 
 6. Michael O. Warnecke, Interactions between PTAB Proceedings and Civil Actions, in ANATOMY 
OF A PATENT CASE 177–86 (Harry J. Roper, et al., eds., 3d ed. 2017). 
 7.  See generally Amanda Tessar, et al., Best practices for IPR proceedings and real party in in-
terest, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW (June 12, 2016), https://www.worldipreview.com/ar-
ticle/best-practices-for-ipr-proceedings-and-real-party-in-interest [hereinafter Best Practices]; Amanda 
Tessar, et al., Real Parties In Interest: Proceed With Caution, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW 
(Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.worldipreview.com/article/real-parties-in-interest-proceed-with-caution 
[hereinafter Real Parties]. 
 8.  Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 9.   On the eve of this publication, the Federal Circuit issued the panel opinion in Wi-Fi One fol-
lowing remand of the case from the en banc court. See Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., No. 15-1944 
___ F.3d ___ (Fed. Cir. Apr. 20, 2018). In its newly issued opinion, the court discussed, at length, the 
legal standards that the PTAB has to-date applied in its the RPI and privy analyses. The court generally 
approved of the PTAB’s legal standards and the application of those standards to the facts of Wi-Fi One. 
Thus, there does not appear to be any change in law that should be expected, at least in the short-term, 
now that the Federal Circuit is exercising judicial review over this subject matter. 
 10.  35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(2), 322(a)(2).  
 11.  35 U.S.C. §§ 315(a)(1), (b), (e)(1), 325(e)(1); see also 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.73(d)(1), 42.101, 
42.201.  
 12.  Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759 (Aug. 14, 2012) (codified at 
37 C.F.R. pt. 42). 
 13.  Lumentum Holdings, Inc. v. Capella Photonics, Inc., IPR2015-00739, Paper 38 at 4–5 
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 4, 2016) (citing Elekta, Inc. v. Varian Med. Sys., Inc., IPR2015-01401, Paper 19 (P.T.A.B. 
Dec. 31, 2015)).  
    
2018 UNCERTAINTY ABOUT REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST AND PRIVITY 3 
PTAB finds that an unnamed party subject to the § 315(b) time bar is an RPI 
or in privity with the petitioner, the PTAB will either decline to institute an 
IPR or, if an IPR has already been instituted, terminate the IPR.14 Addition-
ally, as discussed above, a district court or an ITC administrative law judge 
may also need to determine if a party to a civil action or an ITC investigation 
is an RPI or privy subject to the estoppel triggered by an AIA trial concluded 
with a final written decision. 
I. HOW DOES THE PTAB DEFINE RPI AND PRIVITY? 
The AIA generally defines the petitioner to be “a person who is not the 
owner of a patent,”15 but is silent on the definition of an RPI and a privy. 
Like the courts, the PTAB relies on the common law to supply these defini-
tions. According to PTAB regulations, the RPI under § 315(b) is “the party 
that desires review of the patent,” which may be the petitioner itself or “the 
party or parties at whose behest the petition has been filed.”16 The statutory 
bar of § 315(b) “is analogous to the common-law doctrines of claim preclu-
sion and issue preclusion, which ‘preclude parties from contesting matters 
that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate . . . .’”17 Therefore, 
the PTAB will “look[] to these doctrines of preclusion in interpreting the 
language of §315(b).”18 
The PTAB’s Office Patent Trial Practice Guide explains that whether a 
party not named in a petition nonetheless constitutes an RPI or is privy to 
that proceeding is a “highly fact-dependent question[]” that “will be handled 
by the Office on a case-by-case basis,” based on the framework set forth by 
the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Sturgell.19 In Taylor, the Court, although ac-
knowledging that it was not establishing a “definitive taxonomy,” identified 
the following factors as relevant to the question of whether a third party is a 
privy: 
 
1. Whether the third party agrees to be bound by the deter-
mination of issues in the proceeding; 
 
 14.  See, e.g., Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC v. PPC Broadband, Inc., IPR2014-00440, Paper 
68 at 26 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 18, 2015); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Bennett Regulator Guards, Inc., IPR2013-
00453, Paper 88 at 17 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 6, 2015). 
 15.  35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2012). 
 16.  Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759 (Aug. 14, 2012). 
 17.  Aruze Gaming Macau, Ltd. v. MGT Gaming, Inc., IPR2014-01288, Paper 13 at 7–8 (P.T.A.B. 
Feb. 20, 2015) (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979)). 
 18.  Id. at 7. 
 19.  Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759 (Aug. 14, 2012) (citing Taylor 
v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008)). 
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2. Whether a pre-existing substantive legal relationship 
with the party named in the proceeding justifies binding 
the third party; 
3. Whether, “in certain limited circumstances”, the third 
party is adequately represented by someone with the 
same interests; 
4. Whether the third party exercised or could have exer-
cised control over the proceeding; 
5. Whether the third party is bound by a prior decision and 
is attempting to rehear the matter through a proxy; and 
6. Whether a statutory scheme forecloses successive hear-
ing by third parties.20 
 
The PTAB frequently focuses on the fourth factor (control) as all but 
determinative.21 The PTAB has explained that the “central” factor to its de-
termination is whether “a party other than the named petitioner was control-
ling, or capable of controlling, the proceeding before the Board.”22 A party 
need not exercise complete control of a proceeding to be considered an RPI; 
the degree of control (or funding) requires “consideration of the pertinent 
facts.”23 The PTAB’s regulations explain that “it should be enough that the 
nonparty has the actual measure of control or opportunity to control that 
might reasonably be expected between two formal co-parties.”24 In other 
words, the PTAB inquires “whether someone other than the named petitioner 
is litigating through a proxy.”25 
While RPI and privity issues are often discussed together and frequently 
overlap, even in PTAB regulations and cases, they are not the same. Privity 
is a more “expansive” concept, “encompassing parties that do not necessarily 
need to be identified in the petition” as an RPI.26 The PTAB has explained 
that while the RPI inquiry “focuses on a party’s relationship to a proceeding, 
 
 20.  Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893–95 (2008). 
 21.  See, e.g., Aruze Gaming, IPR2014-01288, Paper 13 at 11; Zoll Lifecor Corp. v. Phillips Elecs. 
N. Am. Corp., IPR2013-00609, Paper 15 at 10–11, 14–15 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2014); Atlanta Gas Light 
Co. v. Bennett Regulator Guards, Inc., IPR2013-00453, Paper 88 at 9 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 6, 2015). 
 22.  Aruze Gaming, IPR2014-01288, Paper 13 at 11. 
 23.  Id. at 11 (quoting Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012)). 
 24.  Id. at 12 (quoting Office Patent Trial Practice Guide Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759 (Aug. 14, 2012)).  
 25.  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 26.  Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759 (Aug. 14, 2012). 
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the privity inquiry focuses on the relationship between parties.”27 For exam-
ple, two parties may be in privity of contract with respect to a product ac-
cused of infringement.28 
When privity issues arise in the context of § 315(b)’s time bar, the 
PTAB considers whether the “relationship between the party to be estopped 
and the unsuccessful party in the prior litigation . . . is sufficiently close so 
as to justify application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.”29 Accordingly, 
PTAB decisions discussing privity have typically looked at the relationship 
between the petitioner and the alleged privy of the petitioner at the time the 
latter was served with a complaint for infringement.30 Therefore, as a practi-
cal matter, while RPI and privity issues tend to overlap, the PTAB will look 
at the relationship between parties in regard to the filing of the petition for 
IPR itself to determine whether a third party is an RPI, and the relationship 
between parties in regard to prior litigation to determine whether a third party 
is a privy. 
II. TYPES OF RELATIONSHIPS CAUSING RPI AND PRIVITY 
DISPUTES 
The most common scenarios in which the PTAB has addressed RPI and 
privity issues include (1) co-defendants in litigation, (2) patent defense or-
ganizations, (3) corporate relationships, and (4) customer/supplier or indem-
nitor/indemnitee relationships.31 The Office Patent Trial Practice Guide itself 
cautions that participation in a joint defense group does not create an RPI or 
privity relationship,32 and PTAB decisions have generally found that a co-
defendant is not an RPI or privy absent a specific connection to the petition 
 
 27.  Aruze Gaming, IPR2014-01288, Paper 13 at 13 (emphasis in original) (citing Int’l Nutrition 
Co. v. Horphag Research, Ltd., 220 F.3d 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 28.  Id. at 13-14 (citing In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochlorine Extended-Release Capsule Patent 
Litig., 504 F. App’x 900, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). 
 29.  Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48,759 (Aug. 14, 2012) (emphasis 
added), (quoting 154 CONG. REC. S9987 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (internal cita-
tions omitted)). 
 30.  See, e.g., Arris Grp., Inc. v. C-Cation Techs., LLC, IPR2014-00746, Paper 22 at 9 (P.T.A.B. 
Nov. 24, 2014) (“Patent Owner does not provide evidence sufficient to demonstrate that, at the time of 
service of the 2011 complaint . . . . Petitioner exercised control or could have exercised control over [al-
leged privy]’s participation in the 2011 district court proceeding”) (emphasis added); Aruze Gaming, 
IPR2014-01288, Paper 13 at 15–16 (PTAB cases “focus on the relationship between the parties in the 
context of the prior lawsuit”) (emphasis added). 
 31.  See Best Practices, supra note 7. 
 32. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012). 
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at issue.33 As for participation in patent defense organizations, merely fund-
ing such organizations does not make a party an RPI;34 however, the PTAB 
has also found that a time-barred litigation defendant, whose arrangements 
with a patent defense organization gave them the ability to suggest patents 
to challenge, was an undisclosed RPI to a petition brought by the organiza-
tion.35 
Corporate affiliations create a more complicated situation, with incon-
sistent results from the PTAB. Common ownership or corporate officers be-
tween related entities does not necessarily create privity or an RPI relation-
ship, absent evidence that the corporate form has been ignored.36 The use of 
common counsel between related entities also does not automatically lead to 
the conclusion that a corporate affiliate of petitioner was an RPI or in priv-
ity.37 However, in other cases, the use of common in-house and outside coun-
sel, as well as overlapping corporate officers, has led the PTAB to conclude 
that lines of corporate separation were sufficiently blurred that related cor-
porate entities should be considered RPIs.38 Additionally, the PTAB may 
rely on the involvement of a related company or its officers in licensing or 
settlement discussions as indicative of an RPI relationship.39 Within the 
multi-factor legal framework under Taylor, the PTAB’s case-by-case ap-
proach has generated divergent and fact-specific PTAB panel opinions about 
related companies, making it difficult for litigants to predict the result in any 
particular case involving corporate affiliations. 
 
 33.  See, e.g., Weatherford Int’l, LLC v. Packers Plus Energy Servs., Inc., IPR2016-01517, Paper 
23 at 11–15 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2017); Syntroleum Corp. v. Neste Oil Oyj, IPR2013-00178, Paper 22 at 
7 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 4, 2013); Denso Corp. v. Beacon Navigation GmbH, IPR2013-00026, Paper 34 at 10–
11 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 14, 2014). 
 34.  See, e.g., Unified Patents Inc. v. Plectrum LLC, IPR2017-01430, Paper 8 at 8–10 (P.T.A.B. 
Nov. 14, 2017). 
 35.  RPX Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00171, Paper 49 (P.T.A.B. June 5, 2014) (public redacted 
version available as Paper 57, July 14, 2014). 
 36.  Aruze Gaming Macau, Ltd. v. MGT Gaming, Inc., IPR2014-01288, Paper 13 at 19 (P.T.A.B. 
Feb. 20, 2015) (citing Gillig v. Nike, Inc., 602 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2010)); LG Display Co., Ltd. 
v. Innovative Display Techs. LLC, IPR2014-01362, Paper 12 at 5–6 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 2, 2015); TRW Auto. 
U.S. LLC v. Magna Elecs. Inc., IPR2014-01351, Paper 7 at 5–8 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 10, 2015). 
 37.  Aruze Gaming, IPR2014-01288, Paper 13 at 20. 
 38.  Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC v. PPC Broadband, Inc., IPR2014-00440, Paper 68 at 19 
(P.T.A.B. Aug. 18, 2015); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Bennett Regulator Guards, Inc., IPR2013-00453, 
Paper 88 at 17 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 6, 2015). 
 39.  Paramount Home Entm’t Inc. v. Nissim Corp., IPR2014-00961, Paper 11 at 8–9 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 
29, 2014); Zoll Lifecor Corp. v. Phillips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., IPR2013-00609, Paper 15 at 9–10 (P.T.A.B. 
Mar. 20, 2014).  
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Finally, customer/supplier and indemnity relationships generally are in-
sufficient to show an RPI or privity relationship,40 unless the evidence shows 
that the indemnitor pays for and controls the IPR.41 
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT STEPS IN 
Although the case-by-case determinations of RPI and privity issues by 
separate PTAB panels have led to unpredictability for PTAB practitioners 
and their clients, the Federal Circuit had, until recently, held that it could not 
review such issues.42 The critical question was the interpretation of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 315(d), which states that “[t]he determination by the Director [of the 
USPTO] whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall 
be final and nonappealable.”43 In Achates Reference Publishing, Inc. v. Ap-
ple, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that § 315(d) “prohibits this court from 
reviewing the Board’s decision to initiate IPR proceedings based on its as-
sessment of the time-bar of § 315(b),” and therefore refused to consider the 
Patent Owner’s argument that the petitioner (Apple) should have been time-
barred due to earlier lawsuits against developers who made apps for Apple 
products.44 The panel held that the words “under this section” in § 315(d) 
modified the word “institute” and therefore specifically prohibited the Fed-
eral Circuit from reviewing the PTAB’s decision that the petition was not 
time-barred.45 
Achates left RPI and privity issues unreviewable by the Federal Circuit, 
and therefore the exclusive province of the PTAB, until the Federal Circuit 
revisited its interpretation of the statute. In Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom 
Corp., the petitioner filed an IPR several years after the patent owner had 
filed lawsuits against multiple defendants, alleging that transceivers in the 
defendants’ products made by the petitioner infringed a patent.46 After the 
PTAB invalidated the patent, the patent owner argued on appeal that the pe-
tition should have been time-barred because of the relationship between the 
petitioner and the prior defendants.47 In a divided opinion, a majority of the 
 
 40.  See, e.g., Nissan N. Am., Inc. v. Diamond Coating Tech., LLC, IPR2014-01546, Paper 22, 
(P.T.A.B. Apr. 28, 2015); Petroleum Geo-Servs. Inc. v. WesternGeco LLC, IPR2014-00689, Paper 101 
at 42-47 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 15, 2015). 
 41.  First Data Corp. v. Cardsoft, LLC, IPR2014-00715, Paper 9 at 7–8 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 17, 2014). 
 42.  Achates Reference Publ’g, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 803 F.3d 652, 658 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 43.  Id. at 655, 658. 
 44.  Id. at 653–54, 658. 
 45.  Id. at 658. 
 46.  837 F.3d 1329, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 47.  Id. 
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Federal Circuit panel followed Achates and held that § 314(d) prohibited ap-
pellate review of the Board’s assessment of the § 315(b) time bar.48 
However, the Federal Circuit granted en banc review and overruled 
Achates.49 The majority applied a “strong presumption” favoring judicial re-
view of agency actions.50  In view of that presumption, the majority narrowly 
interpreted the § 314(d) restriction on judicial review to preclude only review 
of the “threshold” determination under § 314(a), which requires the PTAB 
to determine whether the petition had shown a “reasonable likelihood” of 
prevailing with respect to at least one challenged patent claim.51 Because the 
question of whether a petition is timely filed under § 315(b) is unrelated to 
that preliminary determination, even though it is decided in the decision to 
institute, and is a “condition precedent” to the PTAB’s statutory authority to 
act, the majority ruled that judicial review of timeliness under § 315(b) was 
not precluded by § 314(d).52 However, the en banc court did not address the 
merits of Wi-Fi One’s time bar, remanding the issue instead to the merits 
panel.53 
IV. UNRESOLVED ISSUES 
Many issues remain unresolved following the Wi-Fi One en banc deci-
sion. Although it is clear after Wi-Fi One that patent owners may appeal ad-
verse time bar decisions, the Federal Circuit will need to resolve whether 
petitioners may file such appeals.54 The AIA allows any party dissatisfied 
with a final written decision in an IPR to appeal.55 However, PTAB rulings 
against petitioners over RPI and privity issues typically occur in denials of 
institution56 or, if an IPR has already been instituted, in a decision to dismiss 
or terminate the IPR,57 rather than in a final written decision. Petitioners who 
have not been sued or otherwise directly accused of infringement may also 
have difficulty establishing Article III standing to appeal an adverse decision 
 
 48.  Id. at 1333. 
 49.  Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1371–75 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 50.  Id. at 1372 (citing Cuozzo Speech Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016). 
 51.  Id. at 1372–73. 
 52.  Id. at 1373–75. 
 53.  Id. at 1375. 
 54.  As mentioned, the appellant in Wi-Fi One was the patent owner, after a final written decision. 
 55.  35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012). 
 56.  See, e.g., Zoll Lifecor Corp. v. Phillips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., IPR2013-00609, Paper 15 at 16–
7 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2014).  
 57.  See, e.g., Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Bennett Regulator Guards, Inc., IPR2013-00453, Paper 88 
at 17 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 6, 2015) (terminating IPR and vacating Decision to Institute). 
    
2018 UNCERTAINTY ABOUT REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST AND PRIVITY 9 
on RPI or privity grounds.58 In some scenarios (such as petitions by patent 
defense organizations), the petitioner itself may lack standing to appeal even 
if another party that would have such standing (e.g., an accused infringer in 
a patent lawsuit) was found to be an RPI. Wi-Fi One’s remand panel further 
needs to determine the standard it will apply to RPI and privity questions, 
particularly when the § 315(b) time bar is implicated. Although one judge on 
the original panel was prepared to find that the petitioner was neither in priv-
ity with the defendants in the civil case nor an RPI in that case, the concur-
rence did not discuss the standard applied to reach that conclusion.59 The 
Federal Circuit may also decide whether it will defer to the PTO’s interpre-
tation of the terms “real party in interest” and “privity” under Chevron.60 If 
it does apply such deference, the PTO’s guidance in the Office Patent Trial 
Practice Guide will continue to provide the controlling framework for RPI 
and privity decisions, although it is likely that future Federal Circuit deci-
sions will provide additional guidance in specific factual situations. 
 
 58.  See, e.g., Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1262–63 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014). 
 59.  Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 837 F.3d 1329, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Reyna, J., concur-
ring). 
 60.  See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
